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Tucker Act Jurisdiction over
Breach of Trust Claims
Gregory K. Orrne*

While an Air Force pilot languished in a North Vietnamese
prison camp, the Secretary of the Air Force allowed the pilot's
accumulated pay account to be dissipated by his extravagant and
adulterous wife. Southern Paiute Indians were eligible to share in
a sizable Indian Claims Comrgission award, but were never notified by the Secretary of the Interior prior to distribution of the
fund. Forest lands held by the federal government for individual
Quinalt Indians were mismanaged. Pomo Indians of the Robinson
Rancheria in California had their rancheria status unlawfully terminated.
The injured party in each of these cases sought recovery in
federal court, claiming the action in question constituted a
breach of trust by the United States. In each case, damages for
breach of trust were sought pursuant to provisions of the Tucker
Act, which provides for jurisdiction of claims against the United
States "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."'
In each instance, the jurisdiction of the court to consider the
claim against the United States based on a breach of trust theory
was challenged. This Article considers the propriety of Tucker
Act jurisdiction over breach of trust claims against the federal
government in the context of these four cases.

Through legislation later known as the Tucker Act,2Congress
* B.A., 1975, University of Utah; J.D., 1978, George Washington University.
1. 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(2) (1976).
2. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
The act bears the name of its principal author and promoter, John Randolph Tucker,
of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Tucker, a Virginian, served in the House from
1875 to 1887. J. DANIELS,
THERANDOLPHS
OF VIRGINIA
315 (1976). Tucker was later elected

856

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I979

in 1887 established a jurisdictional scheme, which has survived
to the present, covering a broad range of claims against the
United States. It was not the first such device for the judicial
consideration of claims against the national government.
In 1855, after more than a half-century of wrestling with
private claims against the United States through the cumbersome device of special legislation, a beleaguered Congress was
ready for a change? Creation of a Board of Claims, whose members would serve for four-year terms, was first contemplated in
the Senate.4The substitute bill, which became law, provided for
a Court of Claims to be composed of judges who would serve
"during good behavior ."5
The court was charged to "hear and determine all claims
founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied,
with the government of the United States, which may be sugpresident of the American Bar Association and astounded many of his supporters when
he thereafter appeared before the Supreme Court on behalf of the Chicago Haymarket
Riot anarchists. When criticized for his actions, Tucker responded: " 'I do not defend
anarchy, . . . I defend the Constitution.' " Id.
3. The quantum of private claims pressed upon the Congress by citizens and their
claims agents had grown with the country. As Senator Brodhead explained:
Two days of every week-one third of the time, to say nothing of the time spent
by committees-is set apart for the consideration of private bills and reports,
and yet not much more than half are acted upon; and yet the people complain
that our sessions are too long. Want of time leads to improper legislation, and
often t o great injustice. Those who have honest claims are postponed for
years. . . . The pressure of business of a private character prevents us from
considering great questions in a way becoming statesmen representing this great
people, and this extended empire. Our time is too valuable to be occupied in
discussing the merits or demerits of a private bill. . . . Besides, we are run down
by private claimants, and their agents or attorneys; and private claims are
either passed or pressed into the appropriation bills the last nights of our sessions, contrary to the rules of the Senate, and injurious to the character of
Congress.
CONG.GLOBE,33d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1854).
4. Id. a t 70-71. The bill was introduced by Senator Brodhead of Pennsylvania, whose
remarks on the bill included the colorful, if less than rousing, endorsement: "I am quite
certain, and feel justified in asserting, that if it does not do great good, it is free from
constitutional objection, and will do no harm." Id. a t 70.
5. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. Employment of the quoted phrase from
art. I11 of the Constitution, U.S. CONST.art. III, $ 1, did not prevent a lively debate over
whether the court's judges would be article I11 judges. Compare, e.g., CONG.GLOBE,
33d
Cong., 2d Sess. 110-11(1855) (remarks of Senators Pratt and Clayton) with id. a t 110,112
(remarks of Senators Weller and Chase).
The Court of Claims, as altered by subsequent legislation, was adjudged not an article
I11 court in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). The opposite result was
reached in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
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gested to it by a petition filed therein."Vhe court was not vested
with the power to render final judgments, but was charged with
the responsibility of transmitting to Congress its findings and the
testimony taken, together with its opinion and a draft bill "as if
enacted, will carry the same into effect" for final disp~sition.~
Within a few years Congress concluded it had not gone far
enough. Delay in the final disposition of claims remained significant. In the words of Representative A.G. Porter of Indiana:
Under the practice of the House, the opinion and testimony in
each case are referred to the Committee of Claims, where the
decision, instead of being treated with the respect due to the
solemn adjudication, is regarded, in many instances, with little
more consideration than the petition of the ~ l a i m a n t . ~

Legislation was enacted in 1863 that, among other things, made
the court's judgments final and provided for jurisdiction over
counterclaims asserted by the go~ernment.~
By 1886 some members of Congress perceived the need to
further broaden the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. In that
year Representative Tucker reported for the House Committee on
the Judiciary:
[I]t has long been felt that the benefits could be made much
greater by extending the jurisdiction of the court. By confining
it to claims under a law of the United States, regulations of
Departments, and to cases of contracts expressed and implied,
there is still a large class of cases in equity, in admiralty, and
in tortious acts of the Government through its agents, which are
6. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, Ej 1, 10 Stat. 612.
7. Id. 9 7 at 613.
8. CONG.GLOBE,37th Cong., 2d Sess. app., a t 124 (1862). Representative Porter also
quoted from a letter received from an assistant solicitor of the court:
When I first came into the court it was attended by a very numerous and
highly respectable bar, and the anxiety of claimants to bring their cases to trial
was very great. But by the close of the third session after the organization of
the court, claimants saw that its judgments, if favorable, helped them very little
in Congress, for it required quite as much labor and expense to procure the
passage of the bills reported by the court as to procure the passage of those
introduced by members.

Id.
9. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765. The House had passed a bill that would
have further broadened the court's jurisdiction to include all claims against the United
States, except those based on treaty or preempted by congressional joint resolution,
37th Cong., 2d Sess. app., a t 124 (1862)
whether arising in law or equity. See CONG.GLOBE,
(remarks of Rep. Porter). That provision did not survive the conference committee. See
CONG.GLOBE,37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1480 (1863) (remarks of Rep. Porter).
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left to Congress, for which a court of justice is better fitted to
attain the right between the litigants.I0

The committee's draft bill proposed to expand the court's jurisdiction to include "[all1 claims founded upon the Constitution
of the United States or any law of Congress, or any regulation of
an executive department," as well as claims "for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in respect of which claims the party would
be entitled to redress against the United States either in a court
of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States were suable."li
Provision was also made for concurrent jurisdiction in the regular
federal courts for claims less than $10,000.i2The House passed the
bill in this form, but the Senate appended to the phrase "for
damages, liquidated or unliquidated" the qualifying language "in
cases not sounding in tort."13 This change was accepted by the
conference committeei4 and the Tucker Act became law.
10. H.R. REP. NO. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1886).
11. H.R. 6974, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1, 18 CONG.REC. 623 (1887) (bill as read by
clerk).
Notwithstanding the previously enacted solutions to the problem, the committee was
still constrained to report:
The large mass of business now before Congress growing out of private claims
consumes its time year after year in committee work, rendered useless by the
lack of time to consider and pass upon them. Just claims are painfully deferred
without interest, and the credit of the Government, so strictly upheld upon its
bonded debt, is justly censured in respect to its honest private claims.
H.R. REP. NO. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1886).
The committee sought a final solution t o the continued burden of claims brought
before Congress:
Mr. TUCKER. . . . The only cases not provided for are suits upon the use
of a patent right by the Government and suits in reference to captured and
abandoned property which are now barred by the statutes of limitations. This
bill extends the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to all cases which arise, not
only ex contractu but ex delicto, and to cases in admiralty, so that it will take
the whole mass of these claims away from Congress.

....

Mr. REED. . . . As I understand, the effect of the bill is that the United
States can be made a party defendant in any suit where an individual could be
made a party defendant.
Mr. TUCKER. Yes, sir.
18 CONG.REC. 622 (1887).
12. H.R. 6974, 49th Cong., 2d Sess, § 2, 18 CONG.REC. 623 (1887).
13. Id. $ 1, 18 CONG.REC. a t 2175 (Senate amendment as read by clerk).
14. 18 CONG.REC. 2611, 2676 (1887) (conference committee report). See also id. a t
2677 (statement of House conferees). (Claims for pensions, Civil War claims, and previously rejected claims were also excluded.)
The gap left by the exclusion of tort claims was subsequently filled-with abundant
exceptions, see 28 U.S.C. (i 2680 (1976)-by the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, $9 401-
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Numerous special jurisdiction statutes have been enacted to
give the Court of Claims jurisdiction over a particular claim or
class of claims not otherwise within its subject matter competence, but the principal jurisdictional grant of the Tucker Act has
been little changed. The Judicial Code of 1911 made modest
changes in phrase~logy,~"ut sought only to state "in concise
terms the existing jurisdiction of the Court of Claims."Vhe 1948
legislation that revised title 28 of the United States Code and
enacted it into positive law1' listed the Tucker Act claim categories n~merically.'~
The phrase "in respect of which claims the
party would be entitled to redress against the United States either in a court of law, equity, or admiralty if the United States
were suable" was also eliminated as "unnecessary" for the rather
cryptic reason that "the Court of Claims manifestly, under this
section will determine whether a petition against the United
States states a cause of action."lV Subsequent legislation eliminated the numerical listing of the jurisdictional categories and
made the phraseology of 28 U.S.C. 5 1491, concerning theaCourt
of Claims, correspond to the district court concurrent jurisdiction
provision of 28 U.S.C. 9 l346(a) (2).20
The Court of Claims' basic jurisdictional provision, contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1491, now provides:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation
of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
424, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The.Act vested
jurisdiction in the district courts over
claim[s] against the United States, for money only, accruing on and after
January 1, 1945, on account of damages to or loss of property, or on account of
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment.
Id. 4 410 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976)). Provision was also made for
optional appellate review of such cases in the Court of Claims, rather than the circuit
courts of appeal, but it is a procedure seldom utilized. Id. 5 412 (current version at 28
U.S.C. 9 1504 (1976)).
15. Judicial Code, ch. 231, $ 145, 36 Stat. 1087 (1911).
16. S. REP. NO. 388 (pt. I), 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1910).
17. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (1948).
18. Id. fi 1491.
19. H.R. REP. NO. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. app., a t 138 (1947).
20:Act of Sept. 3, 1954, ch. 1263, § 44, 68 Stat. 1226. See also H.R.REP. NO. 1981,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954).
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contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.**

Section l346(a)(2) vests in the district courts, concurrent with the
Court of Claims, jurisdiction over the same subject matter in
cases where the claim does not exceed $10,000.22

Several modern cases brought pursuant to the general
Tucker Act jurisdictional grant involved claims for breach of a
federal trust relationship and were decided on the merits with
The
little apparent concern about the existence of juri~diction.~~
current controversy must therefore be understood against the
background of United States v. Testan,24 the latest in a long series
of Supreme Court cases circumscribing the scope of Tucker Act
j u r i s d i ~ t i o n .Even
~ ~ though the Court in that case claimed to
merely apply "established principle^,"^^ the decision has been
treated as announcing a definitive jurisdictional test for a broad
range of claims sought to be brought under the Tucker Act."
Testan involved a claim by two government attorneys that
their positions should have been classified as GS-14 rather than
GS-13. After exhausting their administrative remedies, the attorneys brought suit in the Court of Claims seeking prospective re21. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
22. Id. § 1346(a)(2). The jurisdiction conferred on the district courts by § 1346(a)(2)
is in all respects, save amount in controversy, precisely co-extensive with the Court of
Claims' jurisdiction under 9 1491, despite the much broader scope of subject matter
jurisdiction otherwise enjoyed by the district courts. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1941).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes
v. United States, 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. C1. 1975). Not in this category are cases such as
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942), and Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 59 F. Supp. 137 (Ct. C1.1945), which also involved breach of trust claims but which
were brought pursuant to expansive special jurisaiction statutes. See, e.g., Act of May 20,
1924, ch. 162.43 Stat. 133, as amended by Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 651,50 Stat. 650; Act
of Sept. 3, 1935, ch. 839, 49 Stat. 1085.
24. 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
25. See, e.g., United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969) (no jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments); United States v. Holland-America Lijn, 254 U.S. 148 (1920) (no jurisdiction over the alleged torts of federal officials) (distinguishing Dooley v. United States,
182 U.S. 222 (1900) (whether or not claim sounds in tort is irrelevant if claim is founded
upon law of Congress)); United States v. Jones, 131 U S . 1 (1889) (jurisdiction limited to
entering judgments for money; no jurisdiction to command specific performance).
26. 424 U.S. a t 400.
27. See, e.g, Jalil v. Campbell, 590 F.2d 1120, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hill v. United
States, 571 F.2d 1098, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1978); Duarte v. United States, 532 F.2d 850,85152 (2d Cir. 1976); Gentry v. United States, 546 F.2d 343, 345-46 & n.1 (Ct. C1. 1976).
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classification and an award of backpay. A divided Court of
Claims found the administrative refusal to reclassify plaintiffs
arbitrary, but the court concluded that it lacked power to mandate the employees' reclassification. A monetary award was
deemed permissible but premature until an entitlement to the
governmental position was created by the proper authority.
Therefore, the case was ordered remanded to the Civil Service
C o r n m i s s i ~ nIf. ~on
~ remand the Civil Service Commission should
order reclassification, t h a t action "could create a legal right
which [could then be enforced] by a money j ~ d g m e n t . " The
~~
Supreme Court disagreed.
Justice Blackmun, in an opinion that drew no dissent, first
quoted from United States v. KingS0for the proposition that
Tucker Act jurisdiction is limited to money claims against the
United state^.^' He then articulated the Court's general approach
to the case:
The Tucker Act, of course, is itself only a jurisdictional
statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable
against the United States for money damages. The Court of
Claims has recognized that the Act merely confers jurisdiction
upon it whenever the substantive right exists. . . . We therefore
must determine whether the two other federal statutes that are
invoked by the respondents confer a substantive right to recover
money damages from the United States for the period of their
allegedly wrongful civil service classification^.^^

The Court first rejected what it deemed the "implicit" conclusion of the lower court that the Classification Act "gives rise
to a claim for money damages for pay lost by reason of the allegedly wrongful classifications."3SThe Court stated that, as a sovereignty, the United States cannot be sued without its consent,
" 'and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that
court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.' "34 Such consent to suit
" 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.' "35
28. 424 U.S. at 393-96. The Court of Claims is authorized to remand in the following
terms: "In any case within its jurisdiction, the court shall have the power to remand
appropriate matters to any administrative or executive body or official with such direction
as it may deem proper and just." 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
29. Testan v. United States, 499 F.2d 690, 691 (Ct. C1. 1974).
30. 395 U.S. 1 (1969).
31. 424 U.S. at 397-98.
32. Id. at 398.
33. Id. at 399.
34. Id. (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586
35. Id. (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
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"Thus," wrote Justice Blackmun, "except as Congress has consented to a cause of action against the United States, 'there is no
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims more than in any other court
to entertain suits against the United States.' "36
The Court also rejected the contention that the Tucker Act
itself waived sovereign immunity with respect to all claims
"invoking a constitutional provision or a federal statute or regulaBlackmun wrote that since the claim in issue was
t i ~ n . " ~Justice
'
not based on contract and was not one for the return of money
paid the government, " [i]t follows that the asserted entitlement
to money damages depends upon whether any federal statute 'can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Government for the damage sustained.' "38 He and his brethern
declined "to tamper with these established principle^,"^^ and held
that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdi~tion.~~
The Court subjected the Back Pay Act to similar scrutiny
and found that it granted "a monetary cause of action only to
those who were subjected to a reduction in their duly appointed
not to those who contended they were
emoluments or p~sition,"~'
entitled to positions other than the ones they held. The claimants' suit was ordered dismissed.42

A. Mitchell v. United States44
Mitchell involved four related actions by individual Quinalt
36. Id. (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1941)).
37. Id. a t 400.
38. Id. (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. C1.
1967)). The Supreme Court has since held that an "authorized regulation" that can be so
interpreted also satisfies this inquiry. See United States v. Hopkins, 427 U.S. 123, 128
(1976) (per curiam).
39. 424 U.S. a t 400.
40. Id. at 403-04. Therefore, the remand ordered by the Court of Claims was inappropriate since remand is available only in "cases already within the court's jurisdiction."
Id. at 404 & n.7. "The present litigation [was] not such a case." Id. a t 404.
41. Id. at 407.
42. Id. at 408. The foregoing discussion of Testan is limited to a recapitulation of the
Court's decision in order to facilitate understanding of the context in which the cases
discussed in the next Section arose. A more critical assessment of the Court's decision in
Testan is undertaken in Section V of this Article.
43. Excluded from consideration here are trust fund cases like Hoopa Valley Tribe
v. United States, 596 F.2d 435 (Ct. C1. 1979), where the claim is actually one to recover
money improperly retained by the government. These, together with contract claims, were
thought by the Testan Court not to require a separate statute or regulation mandating
compensation for the damage sustained. See 424 U.S. a t 401-02. Trust claims of the Hoopa
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Indians and the Quinalt Tribe, which were consolidated by the
Court of Claims. Pursuant to the General Allotment Act of 1887,
the tribe's reservation, which consisted mostly of forested areas,
. ~ ~ Act
had been divided and allotted to individual I n d i a n ~ The
provided that lands so allotted be held by the United States "in
trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such
allotment shall have been made."4VI'he Interior Department
managed the allotted tracts and the proceeds from timber sales."
The Mitchell plaintiffs asserted that the United States had
breached its trust relationship with the allottees by failing to
obtain fair market value for the allottees' timber, failing to obtain
adequate interest on monies held, and assessing excessive administrative charges.4sThe United States contended that the court
lacked jurisdiction over breach of trust claims."
The Court of Claims rejected the government's jurisdictional
challenge. It noted that the General Allotment Act expressly declared the existence of a fiduciary relationship." Employing the
key phrase from Testan, the court held that this explicit congressional declaration of trust status " '[could] fairly be interpreted
as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the
damage sustained' " as a result of a demonstrated breach of that
trust.51The court relied on its earlier decision in Eastport Steamship Corp. v . United States,52a case also relied upon by the
Testan court, in support of its conclusion that it is not required
that Congress state that a damage action for breach of trust will
lie. It is enough that a statute, fairly interpreted, grants a right
to a monetary recovery by i m p l i c a t i ~ n . ~ ~
The court thus concluded that the General Allotment Act
should be interpreted as implying a right to monetary recovery
for breach of a trust established pursuant to its terms. To hold
Valley variety therefore do not raise the jurisdictional problems presented by actions
seeking damages for the breach of other kinds of trust duties.
44. 591 F.2d 1300 (Ct. Cl.), cert. .granted, 99 S. Ct. 2880 (1979).
45. 591 F.2d a t 1300.
46. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976). See also id. 8 462.
47. 591 F.2d a t 1301.
48. Id. a t 1301 n.4.
49. Id. a t 1301. For six years the government was willing to defend on the merits. But
in 1977, the year following the Supreme Court's decision in Testan, the government
belatedly moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
50. Id. a t 1302.
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. a t 400).
52. 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. C1. 1967).
53. 591 F.2d a t 1302 & n.12.
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otherwise would permit the government to waste allotted Indian
land without providing the wronged party the right to recover in
the Court of Claims.54But for a Tucker Act remedy, the plaintiffs,
though wronged, would be without a remedy altogether."
The most persuasive reason for the court's holding was that
"[tlhe trust language in the statute means that compensation
can be recovered for a breach of trust . . . ."56 In a concurring
opinion Judge Nichols saw this trust declaration as crucial and
as the factor satisfying Testan: "If the United States declares
itself by statute to be trustee of another's property, it assumes in
my view an obligation to respond monetarily, in an action not
sounding in tort, for maladministration of the property that deprives the beneficiary of its value."57Both the majority and concurring opinions seem to have had in mind the well-established
principal that a right of action against the trustee is an integral
element of a trust r e l a t i ~ n s h i pTheir
. ~ ~ implicit rationale was that
by the very act of declaring a trust status, Congress impliedly
mandated compensation for breach of that trust.
The Mitchell court, after making its basic jurisdictional conclusion, went on to show that conclusion to be consistent with its
prior cases and with the expectation of C o n g r e ~ sHaving
. ~ ~ found
jurisdiction in the General Allotment Act, the court concluded
that it was unnecessary to consider whether other statutes cited
by plaintiffs were "independent" sources of jurisdicti~n.~~
It was
also unnecessary to distinguish numerous cases relied on by the
--

-

54. Id. a t 1302-03.
55. Id. This line of reasoning was one of Judge Nichols' points of departure from the
majority. In his view,
the doctrine of strict construction of the consent t o be sued is relaxed little if a t
all by the fact, so far as it is the fact, that the claimant has no other remedy.
No claimant can be said to be wholly without a remedy as long as Congress sits.
Congress has always reserved, and still reserves, adjudication of many claims
for itself, and historically, Indian claims have often been in that category.
Id. a t 1307-08 (Nichols, J ., concurring).
The Supreme Court in Testan had itself considered the issue of alternative remedies.
Like Judge Nichols, however, the Court specifically rejected a correlation between the lack
of another remedy and the jurisdictional propriety of a Tucker Act claim. See 424 U.S.a t
401-04.
56. 591 F.2d a t 1303.
57. Id. a t 1306.
58. See note 108 and accompanying text infra. The court in Whiskers v. United
States, 600 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1979), articulated this principle, apparently considering
it one for which citation to authority was not required. 600 F.2d a t 1335. See Section IVD infra.
59. 591 F.2d a t 1303-04.
60. Id. a t 1304-05.
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government as requiring the opposite result." The motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds was therefore denied and the case
was returned to the court's trial division for a disposition on the
merits.'* The United States appealed. The Supreme Court
granted the government's petition for certiorari?

B. Cherry v. United States64
One month after the decision in Mitchell was filed, the Court
of Claims issued its opinion in Cherry, a case involving facts the
court found particularly troubling. In October of 1965 Colonel
Fred Cherry was shot down over North Vietnam and was captured and imprisoned by the North Vietnamese. The government
did not know with certainty what had become of him. During the
more than seven years Cherry remained a prisoner of war, nearly
$150,000 in pay and allowances to which he became entitled were
paid into an account maintained for him by the Air Force?
Pursuant to the Missing Persons Act, which authorizes the
armed services to allot pay and allowances of missing personnel
to their families when it is "in the interest of the member, his
dependents, or the United state^,"^^ the Air Force paid over to
Cherry's wife nearly all of the funds credited to him. While being
supported by her captured husband, Mrs. Cherry had a child by
another man. Cherry claimed that his wife was extravagant with
his funds and that the Air Force had failed to protect his interests
by allowing her to dissipate his pay account "without let or hindrance. "67
The court agreed that the Air Force had neglected its statutory responsibility to consider Colonel Cherry's interest when it
authorized depletion of his pay account for the benefit of his
adulterous wife. The court concluded that "[tlhe Air Force as61. Id. a t 1305-06.
62. Id. a t 1306. One fairly plain departure from Testan was undertaken by the court
in Mitchell. Although Justice Blackmun had been adamant that the Tucker Act itself was
"merely jurisdictional" and that it did not itself "fundamentally" waive the government's
immunity from suit on claims coming within its general terms, 424 US. a t 400, Judge
Davis found that in the Tucker Act the United States implicitly consented to be sued.
See 591 F.2d a t 1301, 1303, 1306.
63. 99 S. Ct. 2880 (1979).
64. 594 F.2d 795 (Ct. C1. 1979).
65. Id. at 797.
66. 37 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976).
67. 594 F.2d a t 797. Cherry also claimed that the Missing Persons Act was unconstitutional because it authorized a confiscation of property without due process of law. The
court rejected this argument. Id. a t 797-99.
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sumed the role of trustee for Colonel Cherry's pay and allowances-the Missing Persons Act and the Air Force regulations
envision such a relationship, although the word 'trustee' is not
specifically used."6RThe court cited several reasons in support of
this conclusion. First, the court suggested that the statute would
be unconstitutional unless it were interpreted as contemplating
that the holding and disbursement of the fund would be consistent with trust standards? Second, the court concluded that in
carrying out their statutory duties under the Missing Persons Act,
including collecting pay and allowances, forwarding previously
designated allowances to the family, and making a change in the
allotment when changed circumstances warrant, "the armed
services [had] accepted the role of trustee for their missing servicemen, with its attendant duties, including the obligation to
account for breach of fiduciary duties."70 Third, citing Mitchell,
the court argued that the "[dlefendant [would] not, we think,
allege that it owes servicemen missing in action a lower duty than
it does an Indian, whose funds it manages in trust."71 The court
therefore concluded that the Air Force had breached its trust
duties, was liable to Cherry in some amount, and remanded for
a determination of that amount, to be calculated as the total of
sums paid by the United States to "Mrs. Cherry in violation of
its duty to administer the account of Colonel Cherry in his interest, equally with the interest of his dependents and the United
States."72
The majority opinion by Judge Nichols did not focus on the
court's jurisdiction to pass on Colonel Cherry's claim, other than
to note in a sentence that jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. 8
1491.73Testan was not cited, nor did the court analyze whether
the Missing Persons Act could " 'fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damages
sustained.' "74 A forceful separate opinion by Judge Bennett, however, questioned the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Judge
Bennett argued that the congressionally created trust relationship in Mitchell impliedly authorized a monetary recovery for
68. Id. a t 799.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 799-80.
71. Id. at 799.
72. Id. a t 801.
73. Id. at 797.
74. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. at 400 (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United
States, 372 F.2d at 1009).
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breach of trust. That approach was consistent with Testan. By
contrast, the Cherry majority had manufactured a trust relationship, there being nothing in the Missing Persons Act to indicate
Congress had ever contemplated one. The court's decision to
award damages to Cherry was therefore based on " 'unanchored
judge-created principles of fiduciary law' "75 instead of congressional authorization. Judge Bennett concluded that the wrong
done Cherry was within the class of wrongs for which there is no
judicial remedy. "Such wrongs,'' he wrote, "are ghosts in the law
which the court now would slay with weapons not given to it but
belonging to others vested with the exercise of political judgment~.'''~

C. Duncan v. United States77
Mabel Duncan and other Pomo Indians of the Robinson
Rancheria in California obtained a federal district court declaratory judgment that termination of their rancheria status was unlawful. They sought monetary recovery in the Court of Claims on
the theory that the unlawful termination constituted a breach of
trust. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdicti~n.'~
The Robinson Rancheria was established in 1909 as one of
many small Indian reservations created in California in the early
years of this century to ameliorate the landless condition of many
California Indians. In 1958 Congress passed a law providing for
the termination of certain California rancherias upon approval by
the affected Indians of a plan for distribution of the rancheria
lands. Termination of rancheria status had the significant impact
of ending the affected Indians' rights to receive special federal
75. 594 F.2d a t 803 (Bennett, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Mitchell v.
United States, 591 F.2d at 1302).
76. Id. Less convincingly, Judge Bennett argued that Cherry's claim was beyond the
court's jurisdiction because the claim was really one based on negligence theory and was
therefore a tort claim beyond the scope of the Tucker Act. Id. at 802.
The majority opinion in Cherry has raised more eyebrows than Judge Bennett's. The
Tenth Circuit opinion in Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1979)' quoted
from the Cherry dissent and characterized the majority's inattention to Testan as curious.
Id. a t 1338 n.13. See Section IV-D infia. Indeed, Judge Nichols, the author of the C h e w
majority opinion, subsequently acknowledged that the opinion's jurisdictional analysis
was problematic. See Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 823 (Ct. Cl.l979)(Nichols,
J., concurring).
77. 597 F.2d 1337 (Ct. C1.1979)' petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3132 (U.S. Aug.
28, 1979) (NO. 79-36).
78. Id. at 1339.
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services and of exposing the distributed lands to state and local
regulation and tax liability. Prior to distribution of the rancheria
lands, however, the Secretary of the Interior was to effect certain
improvements on the lands, including the installation or rehabilitation of irrigation or domestic water systems that the Secretary
and the Indians had agreed upon.'@
The Porno Indians of the Robinson Rancheria approved the
proposed distribution plan in 1960, and the distributionqwas completed in 1963. Following a delay due to continued negotiation
over the provision of sewer services, the rancheria was formally
terminated in 1965. Prior to termination, however, the inadequate water supply and the poor sanitation system had not been
i m p r o ~ e dDuncan
.~
and the other claimants sought damages for
breach of the trust relationship they contended had existed between themselves and the United States. They specifically sought
damages for failure to provide adequate water and sanitation
systems, failure to reserve a right-of-way in distributed lands to
the community wood lot, exposure to state property taxes, loss of
federal services provided to reservation Indians, destruction of
their native culture, emotional distress, and bodily inj~ries.~'
Relying on Mitchell, the Duncan court summarily rejected
the government's jurisdictional argument that "even if a statute
establishes a trust relationship, that law does not 'fairly mandate
compensation' " under the Testan principle.82The court then proceeded to analyze whether such a trust relationship existed in
favor of the Duncan claimant^.^^ The court's approach was more
involved than it had been in Mitchell, where the court had reasoned that the word "trust" in the relevant statute mandated
compensation by the federal government for the damage sustained." Citing Cherry, the Duncan court found that the lack of
79. Id. at 1340.
80. Id. a t 1340-41.
81. Id. a t 1344 & n.lO.
82. Id. a t 1341.
83. It is not clear whether the court considered the actual existence of a trust relationship to go to the court's subject matter jurisdiction to consider the claims, or whether it
considered the jurisdictional requirement satisfied by the allegation that such a trust
relationship existed, the final determination of that issue being a necessary element of the
court's consideration, on the merits, of the entitlement of the claimants to a monetary
recovery.
84. 591 F.2d at 1302. The Duncan court took substantial comfort from the indication
in the district court's declaratory judgment that the Robinson Rancheria lands had been
held in trust, and went so far as to state that it was "bound by that ruling under the
doctrine of issue preclusion." 597 F.2d at 1341-42. It would certainly seem that a determi-
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trust terminology in the legislation authorizing the establishment
of the California rancherias and legislation appropriating funds
to purchase the land of which they would be comprised was not
crucial given the congressional expectation that the lands be held
in trust: "Congress need not expressly use a talismanic phrase
such as 'trust relationship' or 'hold in trust' in order to establish
The Interior Department's continued una trust relati~nship."~
derstanding that the rancheria was held by the united States in
trust for the Pomos bolstered the conclusion that the intent of
Congress had been to establish a bona fide trust relationship?
The rancheria termination legislation, which employed the
phrase "federal trust relationship," was also entitled to "great
weight" in construing the original legislation, and confirmed the
conclusion that a trust relationship had existed between the
Pomos and the United States with regard to the Robinson Ranche~-ia.~'
The Court of Claims thus concluded that the government's
failure to provide adequate water and sanitation systems constituted a "serious breach of trust."88 The court rejected any recovery based on injury to Pomo culture or on emotional or psychological injuries. It concluded that, notwithstanding congressional
creation of a trust status mandating compensation for certain
kinds of damages, it did not authorize a recovery for such
nation for purposes of declaratory and inhnctive relief that a trust relationship existed
in favor of a group of Indians might not of itself satisfy the Mitchell-Testan requirement
of congressional declaration of a trust, from which is implied a right to a monetary recovery under the Tucker Act for its breach. The Tenth Circuit, for example, perceived that a
relationship could be defined as a "trust" for some purposes, but not for purposes of the
jurisdictional inquiry under the Mitchell-Testan framework. See text accompanying
note 102 infra. It was perhaps in tacit acknowledgement of this fact that Judge Davis in
Duncan undertook plenary consideration of the existence of a trust relationship between
the Pomo claimants and the United States.
85. 597 F.2d at 1342.
86. Id. at 1342 & n.6.
87. Id. at 1343. The Tenth Circuit, in analyzing Duncan, took the position that this
congressional use of trust terminology, although remote in time from the legislation that
gave rise to the creation of California rancherias, was enough to supply the jurisdictional
link of congressional authorization of a damages action based on breach of that trust. See
Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d 1332,1338(10th Cir. 1979).This view appears correct.
There is no suggestion in Testan that congressional authorization of a monetary recovery
for breach of some substantive right must have been given contemporaneously with the
creation of the right itself.
88. 597 F.2d at 1343-44. The loss of land through state tax sales was also considered
a compensable breach of trust. Id. at 1347 n.14. Claims for damages based on the posttermination sale of rancheria lands to non-Indians and exposure to state regulation of
activities on distributed lands were left for further factual development. Id. at 1347.
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"nebulous and remote" consequential damages.89Remand to the
court's trial division was ordered for a determination of the extent
of the government's liability.@O

D. Whiskers v. United Statesg1
Chloe Whiskers and six other named plaintiffs sought recovery under the Tucker Act, for themselves and the class of Southern Paiute Indians they claimed to represent, for the alleged failure of the Secretary of the Interior to include them in the distribution of an Indian Claims Commission award in which they allegedly were entitled to share.92The claimants relied in large part
on breach of trust theories.93The district court dismissed for lack
Plaintiffs appealed.
of juri~diction?~
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge McKay,
briefly reviewed Testan and stated that "the controlling question
is whether federal law mandates compensation for damages
plaintiffs may have sustained because of the Secretary's actions
in derogation of their rights."g5 The court agreed that congressional declaration of trust status for a particular fund "itself mandates compensation for damages sustained from breach of that
trust," and thus satisfies the requirements of Testan.@ T h ecourt
succinctly stated the rationale for this conclusion:
Liability on the part of a trustee for breach of his fiduciary
duties is inherent in a trust relationship. Unless it appeared
affirmatively that Congress meant to create something less than
a trust relationship when it used the term "trust" in referring
89. Id. at 1345-46.
90. Id. at 1347.
91. 600 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1979). Whiskers is the only one of the four breach of trust
cases principally treated in this Article to have been brought in federal district court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 8 1346(a)(2)rather than in the Court of Claims pursuant to 8 1491.
See note 22 and accompanying text supra. In considering the case on appeal, the Tenth
Circuit had the benefit of the Court of Claims opinions in the three previously, discussed
cases and it considered each in reaching its decision. See 600 F.2d at 1335 & n.5, 1338 &
n.12.
92. 600 F.2d at 1333-34.
93. Id. at 1334. The plaintiffs also sought recovery based on an alleged breach of
statutory duties regardless of the existence of a trust, and on fdth amendment theories
that the government's failure to award them any portion of the judgment amounted to a
deprivation of property without due process and an uncompensated taking. Id. These
claims were dismissed, although it is not clear whether dismissal of the constitutional
claims was for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. Id. at 1338-39.
94. Id. at 1334.
95. Id. at 1335.
96. Id.
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to a particular fund, we would necessarily assume that Congress
intended to establish nothing less than a valid trust-complete
with fiduciary duties and concomitant financial liability for
their breach.87

The court then considered whether Congress had expressed the
intent that the judgment award in question be held in trust pending distribution?
Neither the act that appropriated money to pay the Indian
Claims Commission award in favor of the Southern Paiutes nor
the act that provided for distribution of the award indicated to
the court's satisfaction that the fund was held in trust prior to its
d i s t r i b ~ t i o nIn
. ~ reaching
~
this conclusion, the court did not simply ascertain that trust terminology was not employed; it also
considered whether the duties statutorily imposed upon the Secretary of the Interior amounted to congressional creation of a
trust relationship.loOSeveral other statutes utilizing trust terminology were held inapplicable to the judgment fund in question.lol
The court also reasoned that the assertion that the "relationship
of the United States to its Indian citizens is in the nature of a
trust" did not satisfy the Testan requirement of "a specific congressional mandate" to compensate monetarily for the damages
allegedly sustained.lo2Neither was the court persuaded by language in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. United States, lo3 a preTestan case, " 'that funds appropriated to Indians to satisfy judgments of the Indian Claims Commission or of [the Court of
97. Id. Just as usage of trust terminology would not necessarily preclude, in the Tenth
Circuit's view, a finding that Congress had not intended to create an actual trust relationship in contemplation of law, the absence of such terms would not foreclose the conclusion
that Congress had intended to create a trust relationship. See id. at 1338. The key in each
case, according to the Tenth Circuit, is the intention of Congress.
98. The Tenth Circuit, like the Court of Claims in Mitchell, made it cliar that a
congressional declaration of trust status, from which a right to recover monetarily for its
breach could be implied, was a necessary element of its jurisdictional inquiry under
Testan rather than a question for resolution on the merits. See id. at 1335, 1338; note 83
and accompanying text supra.
99. 600 F.2d at 1335-56.
100. Id. at 1338. On this point it is likely that the Cherry court would have gone the
other way. Application of that court's freewheeling approach would readily result in the
conclusion that in carrying out its statutory duties under Indian Claims Commission
award distribution statutes, including enrolling eligible Indians, determining eligibility,
and distributing the award, the Interior Department had "accepted the role of trustee"
for its Indian distributees. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
101. 600 F.2d at 1336-37.
102. Id. at 1337.
103. 512 F.2d 1390 (Ct. C1. 1975).
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Claims], as well as funds produced by tribal activities, are, when
kept in the Treasury, held in trust for the Indians.' "lo4 The court
sought-somewhat laboriously-to distinguish the case,lo5but
took principal solace from the pre-Testan status of that opinion.lo6
Finding no congressional trust declaration, the court concluded
there was no statute mandating federal compensation to the
plaintiffs for the government's alleged breach of trust. Dismissal
of their action for lack of jurisdiction was thus affirmed.lo7

E. Summary
The basic conclusion of the Court of Claims in Mitchell that
a congressional declaration of the existence of a trust relationship
satisfies the jurisdictional strictures of Testan for breach of trust
claims against the federal government is not startling. Trust status inherently entails a right of recovery against the trustee by the
trust beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty.los Short of the
unlikely appearance in some statute of a phrase such as
"violation of this act shall render the United States liable for the
damages proximately caused thereby," it is difficult to suggest
what type of statutory scheme could more readily be "interpreted
as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the
damage sustained" than one that expressly declares the United
States to be a trustee with regard to a particular fund or to partic104. Id. at 1392.
105. Id. a t 1337 & n.lO.
106. Id. at 1337-38. In doing so, the court seems justified. Arising as the case did in
the pre-Testan era, the Court of Claims' subject matter jurisdiction was neither challenged in Cheyenne-Arapahonor treated by the court. In remarking that "funds appropriated to Indians to satisfy judgments of the Indian Claims Commission . . . are, when kept
in the Treasury, held in trust for the Indians," the court was not engaged in a Mitchelllike quest for the requisite congressional mandate for monetary compensation for damages
incurred that is necessary under Testan to establish Tucker Act jurisdiction. Indeed, two
of the cases cited by the Cheyenne-Arapaho court in support of its conclusion, Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942), and Menominee Tribe v. United States, 59
F. Supp. 137 (Ct. C1. 1945), were brought under expansive special jurisdiction statutes,
not the Tucker Act. See note 23 supra. Neither Seminole Nation, Menominee Tribe, nor
the third case cited by the court, United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391 (1973), involved
judgment funds held in the Treasury. Rather, these cases involved, respectively, a trust
fund established pursuant to a treaty, a log fund created by statute, and property held in
trust pursuant to an Indian allotment act. It is IittIe wonder the Tenth Circuit declined
to read much into the Cheyenne-Arapaho characterization.
107. 600 F.2d at 1337.
108. See, e.g., Standard Mach. Co. v. Duncan Shaw Corp., 208 F.2d 61 (1st Cir.
HANDBOOK
OF
1953); Luttrell v. Turner, 307 Ky. 197, 209 S.W.2d 856 (1948); G. BOCERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS4 157 (5th ed. 1973); 3 A. S c m , THE LAW OF TRUSTS 4 205 (3d ed.
1967).
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ular property.
The Tenth Circuit's assessment that Duncan is indistinguishable from Mitchell, given the Congressional declaration in
both cases of a trust relationship, seems entirely valid. Cherry
and Whiskers are more troublesome. Given Testan and the
breach of trust claim refinement offered by Mitchell, Cherry appears to be wrongly decided. Judge Nichols' opinion in Cherry
ignores the jurisdictional strictures imposed by Testan, in contrast to his concurring opinion in Mitchell, which explained more
clearly than did the majority opinion how the result reached in
Mitchell was consistent with Testan. The Cherry majority failed
to treat Testan; although the court's rhetorical statement that
the United States should not purport to owe a lesser duty to a
missing serviceman than it does an Indian trust beneficiary has
emotional appeal, it does not satisfy the rigid jurisdictional inquiry required by Testan.
In light of Testan, Cherry should have been decided the same
way as Whiskers. Notwithstanding the possibility that the
Whiskers claimants had experienced a true monetary loss a t the
hands of the government, the court in that case refrained from
Cherry-style bootstrapping and subjected the statutes in question
to the demands of Testan. In Whiskers the Tenth Circuit has
properly at least drawn a line between breach of trust claims
that-according to Testan requirements-fall within Tucker Act
jurisdiction, and those that do not. The Cherry court overstepped
that line.

V . Testan REVISITED
To conclude that on the basis of Testan there was no Tucker
Act jurisdiction over Colonel Cherry's claim and the claims of the
Whiskers claimants is not necessarily to conclude that there was
no proper Tucker Act jurisdiction over those breach of trust
claims. The Testan opinion is so fraught with difficulties that the
jurisdictional standards it announced must be seriously questioned. Although Cherry is contrary to Testan, Testan is contrary
to doctrines of federal jurisdiction in general, and the Tucker Act
in particular.
In reaching its decision that there was no Tucker Act jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims in Testan, the Supreme Court relied on the Court of Claims' decisions in Eastport Steamship v.
United States'09 and Mosca v. United States.'1° These two cases
109. 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
110. 417 F.2d 1382 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970).
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teach that a claim not based upon a contract or for the return of
money paid to the government must be based upon a federal
statute that requires compensation by the government for damages.lll However, the Court's characterization of this proposition
as an "established principle"l12 is unwarranted.
The plaintiffs in Eastport Steamship alleged that the Maritime Commission wrongfully withheld consent to a ship sale resulting in the loss of a contract more favorable than the one by
l~~
were claimed in
which the ship was eventually ~ 0 l d .Damages
the amount of the price differential between the two contracts.
Judge Davis stated that the noncontractual claims that come
before the Court of Claims are of "two somewhat overlapping"
types:
[Tlhose in which the plaintiff has paid money over to the Government, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of
that sum; and those demands in which money has not been paid
but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless entitled to payment from the treasury.lt4

In cases falling within the latter category, "the allegation must
be that the particular provision of law relied upon grants the
claimant, expressly or by implication, a right to be paid a certain
sum."l15 For this proposition, Judge Davis cited a single case,
South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United States. 116
This case, however, did not fall within the latter category; it
involved a suit to recover an import fee paid the government that
was claimed to have been illegally exacted.l17 It also failed to
employ analysis that segregated Tucker Act claims by category.
Judge Davis reiterated in Eastport Steamship that, in the
second category of cases, " 'a claimant who says that he is entitled to money from the United States because a statute or a
regulation [or the Constitution] grants him that right, in terms
or by implication, can properly come to the Court of Claims, a t
least if his claim is not frivoulous but arguable.' "m However, the
111. United States v. Testan, 424 U S . at 400.
112. Id.
113. 372 F.2d at 1006-07.
114. Id. at 1007.
115. Id.
116. 334 F.2d 622 (Ct. C1. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965).
117. Id. at 623-26.
118. 372 F.2d at 1008 (brackets in original) (quoting Ralston Steel Corp. v. United
States, 340 F.2d 663, 667 (Ct. C1. 1965)).

TUCKER ACT JURISDICTION

quoted opinion, Ralston Steel Corp. v. United States, made the
quoted statement in the context of a first category, or "money
rethined," case.120The statement apparently referred to all types
of claims brought pursuant to the Tucker Act. In addition, the
Ralston Steel court specifically stated that "Wlhere an action
rests upon a statute or regulation, that particular enactment need
not contain a specific provision permitting a suit for money; our
general jurisdictional-statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, serves the purpose."121
The Court of Claims in Eastport Steamship held that a particular provision of the Shipping Act did not, expressly or by
implication, confer a right to recover monetarily against the
But the court did not find that this fact deprived
United States.122
it of jurisdiction, or that it meant that sovereign immunity had
not been waived. On the contrary, the court specifically stated
that it had jurisdiction over the claim; the plaintiff simply lost
on the merits since he failed to demonstrate his entitlement to a
monetary re~0very.l~~
Two points emerge from this analysis. First, the Eastport
Steamship opinion's disparate treatment of contract and "money
119. 340 F.2d 663 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
120. Id. a t 668.
121. Id. a t 668 n.5.
122. 372 F.2d at 1009.
123. Id. a t 1011 n.14. For the Eastport Steamship court, the allegation that a statute
expressly or implicitly grants a right to money damages was enough to establish the court's
jurisdiction; the determination of whether the statute in fact does so was not thought a
part of the court's jurisdictional inquiry. Only if the allegations were frivolous would
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction be proper. The court did not spell out what would constitute frivolousness in this context, but it is clear the requirement is not a difficult one to
satisfy. The court held that plaintiffs' allegation that the Shipping Act granted it the right
to compensation was not frivolous, although the court had said this of the allegation:
There is not a word in the text [of the act] suggesting that the United States
will compensate an applicant who suffers a business loss because of the Commission's improper failure to grant the request. Nor are we pointed to anything in
the Act's legislative history hinting a t that result. There is no decision of this
or any other federal court holding or intimating that the United States will be
liable under the Tucker Act for such a commercial injury resulting from a failure
or wrong done in the course of the regulatory process. We would have to break
entirely new and treacherous ground to find in [the act] an implied directive
to allow such compensation.
Id. a t 1009 (emphasis added). The allegations of a statutory right of recovery in Whiskers
and Cherry would not have been considered frivolous by the Eastport Steamship court if
it was able to so evaluate the allegation made there and still deem it not frivolous.
The nonfrivolity threshold was treated a t greater length in Ralston Steel, see 340 F.2d
a t 666-68 & n.4.' which the Eastport Steamship court cited in reaching its conclusion. See
372 F.2d a t 1011 n.14.
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retained" claims on the one hand, and other noncontract claims
on the other, was not shown in Eastport Steamship to be based
upon recognized distinctions; the authorities relied on in making
the distinctions did not support them. Second, and more significantly, the Eastport Steamship opinion did not ultimately purport to establish criteria for determination of jurisdiction or
waiver of sovereign immunity in the manner for which it was cited
in Testan; the Eastport Steamship court deemed jurisdiction satisfied by allegation of statutory right. Its consideration of the
actual existence of a statutory right to recover monetarily was
considered to be related only to the merits of the claim.
Mosca is technically in a similar posture, since the Court of
Claims dismissed Mosca's petition for failure to state a
~ l a i m ' ~ ~ -dismissal
a
on the merits. However, the Mosca court
also misperceived Eastport Steamship as having held that
jurisdiction over claims other than those seeking a return of
money would be had only where a particular provision of law
granted the right to a monetary re~0very.l~~
To be sure, by the time Testan was decided, the Eastport
Steamship standards had been openly employed in analyzing jurisdiction; but it is hardly accurate to enshrine them as "settled
principles." For example, in his dissent in Chambers u. United
States, 12' Judge Skelton utilized the Eastport Steamship approach, concluding that Tucker Act jurisdiction was lacking.ln
The majority, however, including the author of the decision in
Eastport Steamship, was not concerned about the court's jurisdiction. Judge Skelton also relied on an Eastport Steamship jurisdictional test in his dissent in Allison u. United States. '28 Again,
the majority did not deem Eastport Steamship relevant to jurisdiction. In fact, there is no pre-Testan case in which a Court of
Claims majority employed the Eastport Steamship doctrine, in
the manner the Testan Court employed it, in determining the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
It is surprising that Justice Blackmun found any basis for his
"settled principles" reference. As a federal circuit judge, he had
applied Eastport Steamship to jurisdiction-just as he did in
Testan-but was criticized for this position by the Court of
Claims in Chambers:
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

417 F.2d at 1383.

Id. at 1386.
451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971).

Id. at 1083 (Skelton, J., dissenting).
451 F.2d 1035, 1043 (Ct. C1. 1971) (Skelton, J., dissenting).
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[The United States'] primary reliance [for its view that a
backpay remedy of the sort a t issue in Testan was improper],
however, seems to be on Gnotta u. United States. . . . Judge
(now Justice) Blackmun wrote the opinion sustaining dismissal
of plaintiff's action by the District Court. He adopted that part
of the District Court's opinion which held . . . :
None of the executive orders or regulations which the
complaint cites purports to confer any right on any employee of the United States to institute a civil action for
damages against the United States, in the event of their
violation, even if it should be established that plaintiff's
failure to have been promoted . . . was in fact due to
discrimination in violation of the Executive Orders
pleaded.
The court was of the opinion that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 5
l346(a)(2) ; (conferring on the District Courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims) was not broad enough to confer jurisdiction in such a case. Our line of cases, expressing a
different view, apparently was not cited or ~0nsidered.l~~

It was, therefore, by no means "settled" that in claims other
than those founded upon contract or money improperly retained,
a statute need fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation
for particular damages before Tucker Act jurisdiction could be
found. Indeed, the weight of authority was to the contrary. Reference has been made to several Court of Claims cases that employed jurisdictional analysis at odds with the Testan approachlsO
or that proceeded to the merits over a dissenting objection to
jurisdiction along the lines of Testan. lJ1 Other pre-Testan Court
of Claims opinions employed a much less rigid jurisdictional
analysis than that which was applied in Te~tar2.l~~
In 1974 the
Third Circuit rejected the
reasoning, advanced by the United States on Appeal, . . . that
the Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to award damages to persons
who have a statutory right to receive a sum of money; and, since
129. 451 F.2d at 1052 (citations omitted) (emphasis added)'(quoting Gnotta v. United
States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir. 1969)). Justice Blackmun at least had "constructive
notice" of the quoted passage, having cited Chambers in his opinion in Testan. 424 U.S.
at 396 n.3, 404, 405.
130. See Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045,1052 (Ct. C1.1971); Eastport S.S.
Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1008, 1011n.14 (Ct. C1.1967); Ralston Steel Corp.
v. United States, 340 F.2d 663, 666-68 & n.5 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
131. Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. C1. 1971); Allison v. United
States, 451 F.2d 1035 (Ct. C1. 1971).
132. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 428 F.2d 844, 846 (Ct. C1. 1970).
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the District Court found that the National Housing Act confers
no such right on plaintiffs, the court decided that it had no
Tucker Act jurisdiction. . . .
. . . Plaintiffs allege that the National Housing Act implicitly grants them the right to receive damages from the United
States for violation of specific provisions. They have asserted a
claim "founded upon" an Act of Congress, and their allegation
supports the district court's jurisdiction to decide the merits of
their claim

No less a luminary than Justice Holmes saw no distinction,
for jurisdictional purposes, between general federal question
claims "arising under" and Tucker Act claims "founded upon" a
law of the United States.134In his view, the former required of
plaintiffs nothing more than a claim, made in good faith and not
frivolous, that federal law was the basis of the rights alleged in
the complaint.Iu When such a claim is made, "there is jurisdiction whether the claim ultimately be held good or bad."lJ6
The closely intertwined issue of waiver of sovereign immunity in Testan is also problematic.ls7It will be recalled that Justice
Blackmun in Testan rejected the view that the Tucker Act itself
"fundamentally waives sovereign immunity with respect to any
claim invoking a constitutional provision or a federal statute or
regulation."lJ8 Citing and partially quoting United States u.
Sherwood, 13' the Court stated that "except as Congress has con133. Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1371 (3d Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). The
court added: "We reject any statement to the contrary contained in Eastport Steamship
Corp. v. United States . . . ." Id.
134. United States v. Emery, 237 U.S. 28, 32 (1915).
135. See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25-26 (1913) (opinion
by Justice Holmes).
136. Id. a t 25. In 1927 Judge Augustus N. Hand stated:
To limit the recovery in cases "founded" upon a law of Congress to cases where
the law provides in terms for a recovery would make that provision of the Tucker
Act almost entirely unavailable, because it would allow recovery only in cases
where laws other than the Tucker Act already created a right of recovery.
"Founded" must therefore mean reasonably involving the application of a law
of Congress.
Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique v. United States, 21 F.2d 465, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1927),
aff'd, 26 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1928).
137. Although the questions of Tucker Act jurisdiction and sovereign immunity have
sometimes been thought potentially distinct inquiries, see, e.g., Davis v. Romney, 490
F.2d 1360, 1371 & n.6, 1372 (3d Cir. 1974), in Testan Justice Blackmun equated the two:
" '[Tlhe terms of [the United States'] consent to be sued in any court define that court's
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.' " 424 U.S. at 399 (quoting United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)).
138. 424 U.S. at 400. See notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra.
139. 312 U.S. 584 (1941).

8551

TUCKER ACT JURISDICTION

879

sented to a cause of action against the United States, 'there is no
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims . . to entertain suits against
the United States.'"140The Court also reasoned that where a
claim is not based on contract or for the return of money paid to
the government, the sovereign immunity of the United States is
not waived unless the substantive statute or regulation relied on
itself authorizes compensation by the United States.141The accuracy of these views will now be examined.
Eastport Steamship was cited in support of the lastmentioned proposition. The lack of convincing demonstration in
that opinion that some Tucker Act claims were to be treated
differently than others has been noted,14*as has the fact that the
Eastport Steamship test relied on in Testan was employed by the
Court of Claims to evaluate a claim on the merits, not to determine whether the sovereign immunity of the United States had
been waived.
In Sherwood the Court did not, contrary to Justice Blackmuds reliance on the opinion, speak of the need for a waiver of
sovereign immunity as to a discrete cause of action; rather, the
Court spoke of the "classes of claims" as to which the sovereign
immunity of the United States had been waived.14' Most significantly, the Sherwood Court's entire discussion of the waiver of
sovereign immunity related to the Tucker Act.la5 The Court
stated that the Tucker Act "must be interpreted in the light of
its function in giving consent of the Government to be sued";lu
the Court also spoke of the Act as "authorizing suits against the
G ~ v e r n m e n t . "It~ referred
~~
to the Act as defining "the classes of
claims against the United States which could be litigated in the
Court of Claims."148The Sherwood Court did not perceive any
difference between types of Tucker Act claims, treating "suits
against the United States to recover damages for breach of contract" and those for "other specified classes of claims" a1ike.l"
Finally, the Testan Court's unsubstantiated view that the

.

424 U.S. at 399 (quoting 312 U.S. at 587-88).
Id. at 400-01.
See notes 114-20 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 122-24 and accompanying text supra.
312 U.S. at 590.
Id. at 586-87, 589-91.
Id. at 590.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 587.
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Tucker Act is not itself a fully adequate waiver of sovereign immunity as to actions on any claim coming within its terms is
simply contrary to the legislative history of the Act and the great
weight of pre-Testan judicial authority on the point. The bill that
became the Tucker Act was entitled a bill "to provide for bringing
suits against the Government of the United States."Iw Proponents of the bill spoke of it as granting "the right to sue the
United States."I5l It was stated that "the effect of the bill is that
the United States can be made a party defendant in any suit
where an individual could be made a party defendant."ls2By the
same token, opposition to the bill resulted partly from the concern that, through the enactment of such legislation, the United
States would be permitting itself to be sued.lJ3
It has been noted that Sherwood recognized that the Tucker
Act waives sovereign immunity as to claims within the categories
contained in the Act. Other Supreme Court opinions construing
the Tucker Act or its predecessor are to the same effect.154In
Ralston Steel, cited in Eastport Steamship, the Court of Claims
specifically stated that other statutes need not be looked to for
authorization of a suit against the United States for money damages where the action is based on a statute or regulation; the
Tucker Act was itself deemed sufficient authorization for such
actions.lJ5Although there was not a total lack of authority for the
view taken in Testan, lS6 that opinion's conclusion that the Tucker
Act does not itself constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity as
to claims coming within its terms, which are neither based on
contract nor improperly retained money, appears incorrect when
viewed against the historical background.
150. 18 CONG.
REC. 622 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Tucker). See also H.R. REP.NO. 1077,
49th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1886).
151. 18 CONG.REC.622 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Reed).
152. Id. That certain classes of claims were removed from the bill prior to enactment,
see notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra, does not weaken the force of the statement
in regard to those classes of claims that remained in the legislation as enacted.
153. 18 CONG.REC.2679 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Townshend). In the debate of a
similar bill in 1862, Representative Diven complained that "[tlhe bill proposes to allow
this nation to be sued and brought into court like a corporation or an individual." CONG.
GLOBE,37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1671 (1862).
154. See, e.g, Soriano v. United States, 352 U S . 270, 273 (1957); Kendall v. United
States, 107 U.S. 123, 125 (1882).
155. 340 F.2d a t 668 n.5. See also text accompanying note 121 supra.
156. See, e.g., Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1371-72 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1974).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Even given the constraints of Testan, the Court of Claims
was on firm ground in finding that it had jurisdiction over the
breach of trust claims raised in Mitchell and Duncan. Deference
to Testan precluded the Tenth Circuit from remanding for consideration on the merits in Whiskers, and should have prevented
consideration on the merits in Cherry. But the jurisdictional approach of Testan was misguided.
Viewed against the judicial and legislative background examined in this Article, and assuming that the claims raised were
not frivolous, the Court of Claims had jurisdiction to consider
Colonel Cherry's claim. The district court had similar jurisdiction
to review the claims raised in Whiskers, since the claims were
"founded upon" acts of Congress. By the Tucker Act the United
States has consented to suits for money damages founded upon
federal statutes and regulations. Sovereign immunity was therefore not a barrier to judicial consideration on the merits of these
breach of trust claims.
Once a court has proceeded to consider the merits of a
Tucker Act claim, the Eastport Steamship doctrine, which was
intended to be used in evaluating a claim on the merits rather
than as a jurisdictional test, provides a practical means for determining whether a claimant should prevail. Every governmental
deviation from a statute or regulation should not result in an
award of money to injured persons. Consideration of whether
Congress intended by enacting a statute or regulatory scheme to
compensate persons deprived of some right thereunder would be
helpful in evaluating the propriety of awarding damages to claimants. This consideration, since it is not jurisdictional, should be
supplemented appropriately; a court should also consider the
decisional law on the compensability of claims of the same general typels7and recognize that the clear objective of Congress in
enacting the Tucker Act was to transfer to a judicial forum vir157. The decision in Eastport Steamship suggested that judicial precedents might
have a role to play in evaluating claims. After concluding that the act there in issue did
not mandate compensation for the loss incurred, and that the legislative history was not
to the contrary, the Court of Claims also indicated that "[tlhere is no decision of this or
any other federal court holding or intimating that the United States will be liable under
the Tucker Act for such a[n] . . . injury." 372 F.2d at 1009.
During the debate that preceded adoption of the original Court of Claims act, Senator
Clayton stated that the court would "decide [cases] according to established rules of
33d Cong., 2d Sess. 111
justice, and . . . follow those rules as precedents." CONG.GLOBE,
(1854).
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tually all nontort claims for monetary compensation against the
United States.15uFor example, in a case like Whiskers, it would
be appropriate to consider the comparatively liberal judicial doctrines favoring Indians.I5!'
To be sure, the end result might often be the same as it would
be under Testan. Dismissal, however, would be on the merits for
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, rather than
for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has consistently, and
in a variety of contexts, recognized the importance of this distinction by making it,lB0as did other courts in the pre-Testan era.161
The Supreme Court will review Mitchell in the near future.
The Court will be able to consider the case even against the
strictures of Testan and reach the correct jurisdictional result.
But given the difficulties that attend the opinion in Testan, and
unfortunate decisions like Whiskers, hopefully the Court will take
the opportunity to rethink Testan and reformulate the jurisdictional standards contained in that opinion. In reviewing Mitchell,
the Court would do well to remember the admonition of Justice
Holmes that it is "inadmissible" to consider "that the great act
of justice embodied in the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is
to be construed strictly and read with an adverse eye."162
158. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
159. See, e.g, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); United States v.
Oneida Nation, 576 F.2d 870, 877 (Ct. C1. 1978).
160. See, e.g, Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542-43 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 682-83 (1946); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
161. See Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360,1371 (3d Cir. 1974); Ralston Steel Corp. v.
United States, 340 F.2d 663, 667-68 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
162. United States v. Emery, 237 U.S. 28, 32 (1915).

